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Anmerkungen zur Grundwissenschaft. Von JOHANNES REHMKKE. Leipzig, J. A. Barth, 1913.—pp. 131.

This work is supplementary to the author's *Philosophie als Grundwissenschaft* (Frankfort, 1910) and professes to be an explanation and completion of it. The concept of the individual (*Einzelwesen*) is analyzed at great length and related to various other fundamental concepts such as identity, process, activity, consciousness, subject, thing, and place. Unfortunately, the reviewer has been unable to obtain access to the earlier work and in consequence the significance of some of the author's analyses escape him. Professor Rehmke is a master of dialectic, but without a conviction of the truth of the facts upon which his reasonings rest, especially when he is discussing the relations of consciousness and its activities to the organism, he is necessarily unconvincing in his repeated claims that "the logical analysis of the individual is the key to the world" (pp. 31, 67).

Chapter I establishes the concept of the individual in relation to the concepts of similarity and identity. The most interesting conclusions are that the place of a thing always belongs to its individuality, that there can be no unchanging individuals, and that things cannot be composed synthetically. From the first of these it follows that what are usually called things are but moments in the existence of a transcending individual to which the things, now here and then there, belong as momentary determinations. But the individual is not made up synthetically of these momentary conditions. Synthesis is a result of looking backwards (*Rückwärtsschauen*) and not of groping forwards (*Vorwärtstasten*) (p. 25). "Heraclitus' *πάντα ῥεῖ* is in so far right as it absolutely denies permanence to all individuals in the world as a determination: it is false, however, when it denies change to all individuals as a determination, as when he says, All, *i. e.*, all individuals, are in the flux" (p. 28).

Chapter II deals with individuals and process. The main thesis is that individuals alone change. The individual is a time-filled unity which shows variation in itself but is not itself a variable. In man there are distinguishable two sorts of individuals, soul and body, of which he is the "*Wirkungseinheit*." Process is nothing but a variation in an individual conceived as a particular temporal unity (p. 51). It is therefore wrong to think of conscious process as a variation within a variable soul or consciousness. A type of erroneous psychology arises from failing to note this; the psychology of Wundt, the "soulless" psychology. Such psychology is doomed to be forever unintelligible, for "without the individual (*Einzelwesen*), soul, presupposed, the words 'mental process' lack scientific justification" (p. 56). Its string of states lacks an unity.

Chapter III is entitled "Individuals and Activity." "Whatever in the world is not individual, or the effective unity (*Wirkenseinheit*) of individuals, cannot be conceived in its place and connections, if the individual to which it belongs or pertains is overlooked or put aside as dispensable" (p. 67). Consequently, as activity always pertains to individuals, we are led to seek the individual.

For pre-scientific thinking this is always consciousness. At the moment of operating we find that consciousness knows itself not merely as given only at this moment but also as an individual to which belong other moments beside this moment. Therefore consciousness knows itself at this moment as the activity of itself, *i. e.*, as a self-knowing individual (p. 73). Its activity is will, but consciousness must not be thought to change in its willing. To produce is only to condition an appearing variation. Will is such a producing by consciousness, the condition of an individual relating itself causally to a represented variation. Consciousness cannot bring about its own variations in the sense that A produces or causes B. Such effecting demands at least two individuals; man, being an effective unity of soul and body, two individuals, seems to produce such effects in himself.

Chapter IV, on Consciousness and Subject, Thing and Place, eliminates the false connotations of a subject as an individual by showing its origin in the misinterpretation of the situation "I am a perceiving, a feeling, a thinking" as "I perceive, feel, think." In this chapter Professor Rehmke also returns to his problem of spacial conditioning, and distinguishes with much subtlety quantity, form, and place as "thing-conditions" more primary than mere position. Zeno's difficulties are explained as the result of confusing things and places. His conclusions were right as meaning that one place-thing cannot pass into another place-thing. Motion is really a change of a thing with respect to its place-determinations, *i. e.*, a change of place-determinations (p. 119). Similarly, a line, as a continuum, cannot be conceived as a series of points for this is contradicted by the very conception of "continuum." Furthermore, just as every place has its location-determination so every movement has its direction-determination. And, finally, things are not infinitely divisible, but this is not because simple things have not quantity as a determination, but because they are not unitary effects (*Wirkenseinheit*).

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Das Ich als Dolmetsch für die Erkenntnis des Nicht-Ich. Von H. G. OPITZ.
Berlin, Leonhard Simion Nf., 1913.—pp. 42.

This monograph, which forms the seventh volume of the *Bibliothek für Philosophie*, undertakes to answer the question how a knowledge of the external world is possible. The author draws a distinction between the psychological and metaphysical aspects of the problem of knowledge, giving over to the field of psychology the treatment of the process of knowledge as such, while retaining for the metaphysician the problem of the relation between the process of knowledge and its object. It is this latter problem with which he himself is concerned, his particular interest being to determine what are the presuppositions of the knowing relation between subject and object. The answer which he gives to this question is that "we somehow bring the external world into relation to the ego," and that it is only in so far as we are successful in this that knowledge of the external world by us is possible (p. 19). Later, in sum-